priests, and severe financial pressures, O 'Malley said that he had no choice but to order the closings and mergers. When outlining the changes, O 'Malley put on a brave face: "Please do not interpret reconfiguration as a defeat. It is rather a necessary reorganization for us to be positioned for the challenges of the future."2 With these closures, the Archdiocese, which had 404 parishes in 1985, had reduced its number to 292. Later in the summer O 'Malley announced another round of 10 parish closures in the northern section of the archdiocese.
While especially acute, Boston's plight is by no means unique. Recently, the Bishop of Toledo, Ohio, Leonard Blair, announced plans to close 33 of the 157 parishes in the diocese. 3 In New York City, the Archdiocese recently announced plans to close and tear down St. Thomas the Apostle, a landmark church in Harlem. In Portland, Oregon, and in Phoenix the bishops have filed for bankruptcy, citing the costs of settling sexual abuse claims in their dioceses.
When I read about Fr. Peyton's phenomenally successful crusade or about Bishop Fulton Sheen's immensely popular prime time television show, Life is Worth Living, I find myself perplexed about how American Catholicism has been transformed so drastically in such a short time.
For answers to this mystery, one can turn to David Carlin's informative and sobering work, The Decline and Fall o f the Catholic Church in America (2003) . Carlin, a professor of sociology, contends that American Catholicism was blindsided by the aftershocks of Vatican II, the decline of the "Catholic ghetto," and the onset of the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Together these three factors coalesced into what Carlin terms a "perfect storm."
In the wake of the Council, Catholics shed or at least de emphasized many of their distinctive practices and beliefs, preferring instead the teachings they shared with Protestants. Carlin claims that Catholics adopted a "denominational mentality," seeing themselves no longer as the "One, True Church" but as one distinct expression of Christianity. Along with this new bland theology, Catholics also had to adjust to life in the American mainstream. They were moving out of their tight-knit urban neighborhoods and into ethnically and religiously diverse suburbs. The world that they were entering was proving surprisingly friendly. Much of the old Protestant animus to Catholics had disappeared.
However, a graver threat awaited them. Catholics were leaving their "ghettos" just as the larger society was starting to unravel. Racial tensions were worsening, the Vietnam War was proving increasingly divisive, and more and more students were experimenting with LSD and casual sex. Nor were young people the only ones losing their bearings. Divorce among the middle-aged was becoming commonplace by the 1970s.4 Carlin blames much of this cultural crisis on secularism. Secular humanists were moral relativists who aggressively promoted libertarianism.
Carlin astutely notes that the secularist groundswell did not occur simply as a result of Vietnam and civil rights. He points out that secularist seeds were being sown in the 1950s. In films, James Dean and Marlon Brando played rebel heroes, and in literature, Allen Ginsberg and his Beat friends were promoting nonconformism. In many universities, the works of anthropologists Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict along with that of the atheist philosopher A.J. Ayer were standard texts. Together these books gave students the impression that all cultures were equal and all value systems were man-made constructions.
Despite support from Hollywood and the universities, secularists remained on the defensive throughout the 1950s. With the Cold War at its height, any form of godlessness was bound to be frowned upon by most Americans. The secularists' break came in 1962, when the Supreme Court struck down prayer in the public schools, declaring it to be an establishment of religion. Carlin rightly notes that the secularists were now on an equal footing with the majority who belonged to the "Judeo-Christian tradition." Emboldened by this victory, secularists became increasingly militant as the 1960s progressed. Again and again, whether pressing for birth control or abortion or gay rights or euthanasia, secularists were sure to receive a sympathetic hearing from the courts.
Carlin is disturbed that American Catholics don't seem able to recognize that secularism is the enemy. He notes that in the past, Catholics were quite willing to spar with their Protestant rivals. Now, however, when the threat is so much more serious, they remain largely wedded to what Carlin calls "generic Christianity"-a cheerful, fuzzy set of beliefs which are bound not to offend-or inspire-anyone.
Carlin These statistics seem to indicate that there will be few progressive-minded priests and sisters in the years to come. This is not to suggest that liberal Catholicism is about to disappear. On the contrary, they have a powerful new lobby, the Voice of the Faithful, a series of influential journals, and a commanding presence in the old-line Catholic universities such as Notre Dame and Boston College. Still, liberal Catholicism will be a mostly lay affair, and I think that will lessen its impact.
Thus, in these five areas at least, I see reasons for optimism. While my projections are somewhat sunnier than Carlin's, I still think that his fine book is must reading for anyone interested in understanding how the Church has ended up in this unhappy state.
Notes

